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APPROPRIATE SUBJECTS FOR BARGAINING IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LABOR RELATIONS
By WILLIAM J. KILBERG*
Unionism has come to the municipal service. Of 1,358
cities surveyed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Affairs, seventy-five percent reported that their labor
force was organized.' "No cities over 500,000 and only four
percent of those from 100,000 to 500,000 lacked public employee
organizations. "'2
The introduction of unionism into the public sector has meant
an end to unilateral decision-making. The era of "management-by-
itself" is over, and the age of bilateralism - "consultation, negotia-
tion and bargaining" - is here.' This public sector unionization
provides a challenge to the fundamental nature of a democracy - re-
sponsibility to popular control - because with true collective bar-
gaining there is some degree of compulsion upon the employer to
reach agreement, whether it be through a threat of illegal strike or
through some less drastic coercive action by the union."
This paper attempts to develop a balance between unilateral and
bilateral decision-making in order to safeguard, where needed, the
responsiveness of local government to the popular will. The first sec-
tion discusses certain trends in the law of local government labor
relations, setting forth the legal bases for the right to bargain in public
employment at the local level and analyzing the duty and the scope
of the duty to bargain. The second part of this study attempts to
define the proper limits which ought to be placed upon the scope of
collective bargaining in the municipal and county public service. As
two scholars in the field of public employee labor relations have
phrased the question, "What are the minimum policy and administra-
* General Counsel, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service; B.S., 1966,
Cornell University; J.D., 1969, Harvard Law School.
1. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT POLIcIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 29 (1969).
2. Id. Of 209 counties responding to a questionnaire, 117, or fifty-six percent,
reported at least one employee organization. Id. at 40.
3. Stanley, What are Unions Doing to Merit Sytems?, 31 Pun. PERsoNNEL
Rzv. 108 (1970).
4. See notes 39-43 ixfra and accompanying text.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tive decisions which must remain subject to the public will, either
directly or indirectly, if we are not to transform our government from
a political democracy to an economic autocracy?"'
I. TRENDS IN THE LAW
A. The Right to Bargain
Most national labor legislation has carefully excluded public
sector employment from its coverage.6 Each state, then, has been
free to develop its own conception of the proper route for local gov-
ernment labor relations to take.7 This has resulted in confusion and
contradiction, with the acceptability of collective bargaining varying
with the jurisdiction.8 Judicial disagreement has most often centered
over the propriety of collective bargaining in the absence of enabling
legislation. For example, a recent Florida decision 9 declared that a
municipality, absent enabling state legislation, is not legally author-
ized to enter into a collective agreement with a union.' 0 In a land-
5. K. WARNER & M. HENNESSY, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING
TABLE 262 (1967).
6. See Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§
152(2)-(3) (1964); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964), construed in
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) to be inapplicable to
employees of the federal government. But see Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151(1964), construed in California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) to be applicable to
employees of a state-owned railroad.
7. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT, REPORT OF THE INTERIM COMMISSION TO STUDY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY MUNICIPALITIES (1965); MICHIGAN, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (1967); MINNE-
SOTA, REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS(1966); NEW YORK CITY, REPORT OF THE TRIPARTITE PANEL TO IMPROVE MUNICIPAL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURES (1966); RHODE ISLAND, COMMISSION TO STUDY
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION (1966). An overall analysis is contained in EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LABOR RELATIONS (1967). See also ADVISORY COM-
MISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1969); MARITIME TRADES DEPARTMENT, EXECUTIVE
BOARD, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN INTERIM REPORT (1969).
8. Compare N.Y. CIv. SERV. §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1969) and ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 243.720-.760 (1953) with MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-.572 (1966) and
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-53-14 to -16 (1953). The statutes differ in that Oregon and
New York mandate collective bargaining for all municipal employees. The New
Mexico statute authorizes municipalities to enter into collective bargaining with
unions representing municipal transit workers; there is no comprehensive labor rela-
tions act for public employees. The Minnesota statute is couched in terms of a good
faith obligation on the part of the municipality to resolve grievances. In Wisconsin
there is a qualified area of collective bargaining. No right to bargain is set forth in
the statute nor is a refusal to bargain prohibited, but certain subjects are delineated
for bargaining. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (Supp. 1969). Only three states statu-
torily prohibit collective bargaining in their public service. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 95-97 to -100 (1965), upheld in Adkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068(D.N.C. 1969); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c, §§ 1-6 (1962); S.J. REs. 12,
[1946] Va. Acts 1006.
9. Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965).
10. See also International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 321 v. Water Works
Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964) ; IBEW Local 283 v. Robison, 91 Idaho 445,
423 P.2d 999 (1967); IBEW v. City of Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822




mark decision holding to the contrary," the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut held that, without need of a permissive statute and absent
a prohibitory one, a board of education may bargain collectively with
its teachers with regard to salary, grievances, procedures and work-
ing conditions within the board's power to contract, provided that
the agreement is limited to members of the teachers' association and
no strike threat is present.'
2
The Hobbesian notion of sovereignty has most often provided
the basis for the proscription of public sector collective bargaining.18
Sovereignty suggests a condition of supremacy - the state as
final legal authority and political power. It evolved from the notion
of English common law that "the King can do no wrong"; as
it later developed in the United States, it was rephrased to read
"the states are sovereign."' 4 The sovereignty doctrine is clear in its
placement of ultimate authority and, since the government cannot
be coerced into doing anything it chooses not to do, the doctrine is
an "effective bar to any action on the part of government employees
to compel the government to enter involuntarily into any type of
collective bargaining relationship.' ' 5  There is no reason, however,
why state governments cannot enter voluntarily into collective bar-
gaining agreements' 6 or cannot permit local governmental units to
enter into such agreements. Notions of unions as illegal conspiracies
belong to an era long past. If a state can contract with one employee,
there is no good reason to deny it the power to contract with two
or more employees as a group. Furthermore, an analogy may be
drawn to the situation in which the sovereign authority has con-
sented to suit - an act which in reality is a partial abdication of its
sovereignty through the exercise of its sovereign power. To deny
state governments this right would be to deny their sovereignty.
That this concept has been accepted by a growing number of state
legislatures is testified to by the increasing number of states which
have enacted legislation specifically authorizing collective bargain-
ing in the. public sector.' 7  However, the question remains whether
subdivisions of the state - cities and counties which have generally
followed the sovereignty doctrine and banned public sector collective
bargaining on the ground that local government cannot delegate to
11. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951).
12. Id. at 277-78, 83 A.2d at 486. See also City of Fort Smith v. Arkansas State
Council No. 38, AFSCME AFL-CIO, 245 Ark. 409, 433 S.W.2d 153 (1968) ; Chicago
Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 I11. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966) ;
Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 151 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1956) ; Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294
(1947). See generally Seitz, School Board Authority and the Right of Public School
Teachers to Negotiate - A Legal Analysis, 22 VAND. L. REV. 239 (1969).
13. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
14. Cf. THE FEDERALIS'r No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
15. W. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 44 (1961)
(emphasis added).
16. W. VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE U.S. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 18(1966) ; cf. A. HACKER, THE STUDY OF POLITICs 40 (1963): "The process of
sovereignty ... is more concerned with how laws are passed than with v'hat they say."
17. See note 8 supra. For a summary of existing law permitting collective bar-
gaining in the public sector, see Comment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 547, 555-57 (1970).
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others powers that have not been delegated to it by charter or stat-
ute"8 - may enter into collective negotiations with their employees
absent enabling legislation.
In the absence of home rule,'9 the power of local governments
has been narrowly construed. 20  Local governments are the creation
of the sovereign; their powers are defined by charter or by statute.
But it is often possible to infer from these powers the authority to
bargain collectively. Where a local public employer has been granted
a general power to contract in the course of its operations and, par-
ticularly, to enter into employment contracts, a power to execute
collective bargaining contracts may be fairly implied.21 It may be
argued, moreover, that a public employer's general power to conduct
its day-to-day operations is sufficiently inclusive to permit consulta-
tion with all persons affected by such activities.22 Unions are groups
of such persons.
A recent law review note23 envisions a "common law of labor
relations" based upon judicial interpretations of federal labor legis-
lation and argues that this common law "demands the recognition
of a right to collectively bargain" in the public sector.24 Analogizing
from dictum in Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co.,2 5 wherein Justice Harlan made reference to this con-
cept, the note concludes that:
Based upon the law as it has been applied in extending to public
employees full rights of freedom of expression and association
to organize and join labor unions, it is conceivable, based upon
the above view of the common law of labor relations, that a
court will decide that a refusal to bargain is an unfair labor
practice not permitted to any employer, including the states and
their political subdivisions.2 1
Although the cases and theory may not yet dictate a duty to bargain
in the public sector, there appears to be ample support for the right
to bargain collectively in local government labor relations without
enabling legislation, at least in the absence of statutory prohibition.
18. E.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P2d 547 (1962); City ofSpringfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).19. Generally, home rule is defined as local power to manage local affairs subjectto general laws. See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9.08 (2d ed. 1966).20. See, e.g.. Wichita Pub. Schools Employees, Local 513 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2,397 P.2d 357 (1964); Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App.524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957), citing Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 712-13, 37 S.W.
689, 693 (1896).21. Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement &Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) ; accord, Chicago Div. of I11. Educ.Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); Civil Serv.Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 App. Div. 2d 117, 163 N.Y.S,2d 476(1957), aff'd mern., 4 N.Y.2d 866, 174 N.Y.S.2d 234, 150 N.E.2d 705 (1958).22. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 486(1951) ; Local 59, Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 255 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d358, 367 (1966); M. LIEBERMAN & M. MosKow, COLLECTIVE NwarriATIoNs FOR
TEACHERS 328 (1966).
23. 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 361 (1970).
24. Id. at 364.
25. 374 U.S. 367 (1969).
26. 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 361, 365 (1970).
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However, the courts have long recognized the uniqueness of
governmental responsibility - a responsibility not merely to a group
of stockholders but rather an affirmative duty to further the good
of the polity. A city administration, no less than the federal or state
government, is the guardian of all of the public's rights and has the
duty to retain the legal authority to repudiate any of its commit-
ments for the benefit and safety of the commonweal. It is this duty
and responsibility of government which has caused so much con-
fusion. "The issue is not . . . [the critics] say whether government's
power is 'supreme' but how government as an employer ought to
exercise that power."' 27 The doctrine of illegal delegation of power
speaks to this issue."'
This doctrine, to an even greater extent than sovereignty, is
known primarily for its vagueness. While the courts have been par-
ticularly nebulous in their description of "delegation, '2 the concept
is founded upon, and one step removed from, the sovereignty doc-
trine, i.e., local government may not legally delegate any of its au-
thority as to matters properly within its legislative discretion as
defined by charter or by statute nor abdicate any of its responsibility
to private parties. Because its origin is similar to that of the sov-
ereignty doctrine, it has been misleadingly used as a prohibition against
collective bargaining.30
The most meaningful definition of illegal delegation of power,
however, and one that recognizes the need for public policy limita-
tions on the collective bargaining process in the public sector, is the
one given by Professors Wellington and Winter: "The doctrine of
illegal delegation commands that certain discretionary decisions be
made solely on the basis of the judgment of a designated official." 1
The need for these limitations stems from the fact that it is implicit
in any scheme of collective bargaining that control be shared by
management and the union; there is a possibility that a particular
issue of critical importance to the public interest might be sacrificed
to the give and take of the bargaining process. This concept, then,
goes not to the existence of collective bargaining but rather to the
scope of bargaining; it forsees a limitation to the extent of bilateral
decision-making but does not prohibit the negotiation process in its
entirety.
As this doctrine recognizes and seeks to protect the affirmative
duty of government to serve the good of the community, it favors -
rather than bars - the process of collective bargaining. This is most
27. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Em-
ployment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107. 1109 (1969).
28. Id.
29. E.g., "To the extent that [questions of wages, hours, and working con-
ditions] . . . are left to the discretion of any city department or agency, the city
authorities cannot delegate or abdicate their discretion. Any exercise of such dis-
cretion . . . is at all times subject to changes or revocation in the exercise of the
same discretion." Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d 745,
747 (1945).
30. E.g., Local 59, Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 255 Minn. 347, 147
N.W.2d 358 (1966). See generally cases cited State Bd. of Regents v. United Packing
House Food and Allied Workers, Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110, 116 (Iowa 1970).
31. Wellington & Winter, supra note 27, at 1109.
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clearly so because collective bargaining is a means of achieving labor
peace812 and employee efficiency. As stated in a report by the Twen-
tieth Century Fund:
Through a union representative system public officials can de-
velop more effective communications with employees. A sense
of participation can increase employee morale. With represen-
tation accorded it, a union enters a limited partnership with
management and assumes responsibility for employee compli-
ance with rules and practices it has agreed to. It brings to man-
agement's attention grievances which, left undisclosed, could
become nuclei of dissatisfaction and deteriorating performance.
33
To summarize, collective bargaining has a place in the public
sector. The legal arguments against it are weak and public policy
favors it.3 4 There are, however, limitations recognized by the doc-
trine of illegal delegation of power which are aimed at safeguarding
the public interest. The second half of this paper is devoted to an
analysis of what those limitations ought properly to be.
B. The Duty and the Scope of the Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith
The argument has been made that collective bargaining ought
to be permitted in public employment; now we must determine what
we mean by collective bargaining. What is it that the parties are
required to do, how are they expected to behave and what are they
expected to discuss at the bargaining table for there to be "true" col-
lective bargaining?
This, of course, is not a problem unique to the public sector.
In the private sector this duty has been defined as "the mutual obli-
gation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession." 5 This concept of "good faith"
bargaining has been applied to both procedural and substantive mat-
ters. Bad faith may be inferred from the nature of proposals made"e
32. "The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodically determin-
ing the conditions of labor by collective bargaining between employers and employees
is that thereby each side obtains a better understanding of the actual state of the
industry, of the conditions which confront the other side, and of the motives which
influence it. Most strikes and lockouts would not occur if each party understood
exactly the position of the other." FINAL REPORT OF T11E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 844
(1902). For an analysis related to peace in government employment, see FINAL
REPORT, GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 9 (N.Y. 1966).
33. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, PICKETS AT CITY HALL 7 (1970).
34. Cf. ABA, SECONO REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR RELATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 125 (1955).
35. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). See generally
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958). See also
H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), where the Court held that
although the NLRB has the power to order the parties to negotiate, it has no power
to compel either party to agree to a substantive matter.
36. White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum).
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and from tactics or procedures employed.87 Bad faith has also been
inferred in a situation where a party's tactics were not, per se, evi-
dence of bad faith but where the failure to supply information to
the other party made collective bargaining impossible.8 The courts
have been particularly insistent that the good faith concept imposes
absolutely no requirement that the parties reach agreement. How-
ever, at the same time they have announced that it does "impose a
duty to negotiate with an open and fair mind and a sincere purpose
to find basis for agreement" 9 and that it "demands more than sterile
and repetitive discussion of formalities precluding negotiations, and
requires a sincere effort to reach agreement although not agreement
itself."4 Specifically, it requires more than the proposal of a par-
ticular provision and absolute refusal to even consider modification ;41
and it demands a certain amount of exchange of relevant informa-
tion to ensure intelligent negotiation.4 It requires enough "give
and take" to say that some degree of shared control is implicit in the
good-faith bargaining concept.43 There exists another element out-
side the statutory scheme which supports this idea of shared control
in true collective bargaining, i.e., the practical impact of the negotia-
tion process. Notwithstanding the employer's right ultimately to
refuse to make concessions, the union- even if a no-strike clause
exists - may exert enough pressure in the form of publicity, protest
techniques or a general discontent among the union members which
adversely affects the workers' performance to create some compul-
sion upon the employer to reach agreement and thereby transform
the entire procedure into one of shared control.
There is evidence that the private sector model is being adapted
to the public sector, the courts providing to the public sector the
same expansive interpretation of the good faith concept that has
been applied in the private sector. Michigan has been a forerunner
among the states in requiring its local governments to bargain in
good faith.44 In one instance, the Michigan Labor Mediation Board in-
validated the action of the Detroit Board of Fire Commissioners
raising the requirements for promotion to certain positions. The
Labor Board did not deal with the question of the validity of the
new standards themselves, but objected strenuously to the Commis-
sioner's unilateral action and failure to make a good faith effort to
resolve differences through negotiations.45 In School District v. Hol-
land Education Association,8 the Board of Education of Holland,
Michigan, after five months of bargaining without reaching agree-
37. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).38. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
39. NLRB v. McLane Co., 405 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1968).
40. NLRB v. W.R. Hall Distributor, 341 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1965).
41. General Elec. Co. & Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers AFL-CIO,
150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964) ; see Forkosch, Boulwarism: Will Labor-Management
Relations Take It or Leave It?, 19 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 311 (1970).
42. NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1967).
43. Wellington & Winter, supra note 27, at 1109.
44. Werne, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, 22 VAND. L. Rav. 833,
840-44 (1969).
45. Detroit Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, No. C67, F-58 (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd. 1968).
46. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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ment, informed the Holland Education Association that the schools
would be open that fall. The teachers filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging that the Board had refused to bargain in good faith ;47
the teachers refused to report to work on the opening day of classes.
The Board of Education petitioned for and received a preliminary
injunction ordering the teachers to refrain from the strike action.4"
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunc-
tion,' 9 and the teachers' association appealed to the Supreme Court
of Michigan5
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and dissolved
the injunction, upholding the argument of the appellants that an in-junction is a proper remedy only when a court has found that a
particular strike would cause irreparable harm to the public, violence
or breach of peace.5 ' Although basing its holding on the absence of
public harm, the court remanded for a determination of the employer's
good faith bargaining, thus allowing the inference that an injunction
against striking public empolyees in Michigan will be granted only
where there is irreparable harm to the public or where the employer
has first bargained in good faith. Thus it would seem that the public
employer must enter court with clean hands.5 2
A recent California decision53 indicates that the trend toward
adopting private sector standards of good faith bargaining is not
isolated. The Hospital Employee's Association was granted injunc-
tive relief to keep the Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County
from opening and declaring any bids received pursuant to the Board's
attempt to contract out food management services at San Mateo
General Hospital. The court held that the proposed plan wouldjeopardize the jobs of Association members and that the Board was
required to first negotiate in good faith with the Association.5
47. For the standards of good faith collective bargaining in Michigan, see MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967). The provision is very similar to the federal
standard, imposing the obligation upon both parties to "confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotia-
tion of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract, ordinance or resolution incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. .. ."
48. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, No. 1238 (Cir. Ct. Ottawa County,
Mich., decided Sept. 6, 1967).
49. 7 Mich. App. 569, 152 N.W.2d 572 (1967).
50. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
51. Id. at 326, 157 N.W.2d at 210.
52. But see Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867(1968). Under N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1968), a public em-
ployer is unconditionally obligated to seek an injunction against an illegal strike, and
the court is required to grant it. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2) (McKinney 1968).
But see In re Local 69, AFSCME, No. D-0014 (N.Y.P.E.R.B., May 8, 1970),
where the penalty for a strike action was limited to forfeiture of dues deduction at
the hospital locations involved in the strike because "the public employer and its
representatives engaged in such acts of extreme provocation as to detract from or
mitigate the responsibility of the employee organization for the strike." Id. at 28.
53. Employees Ass'n v. County of San Mateo, No. 142834 (Super. Ct., Cal.,
Feb. 27, 1969) (mem.), cited in Poyer, Good Faith In Collective Bargaining, 2 CAL.
PUB. EMPLOYEE LABOR RaEIrIONS 1, 3 (1969).
54. Id. The California statute imposes an obligation to "meet and confer in good
faith, regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." The
obligation is defined as "the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer in order
to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach
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In the private sector the duty to bargain in good faith and the
scope of the duty to bargain are inextricably intertwined. A party's
refusal to bargain over particular subject matter may invite an unfair
labor practice charge from the other party.5 This most often occurs
because of the employer's56 assertion of a "management prerogative"
over which, he argues, he is not compelled to bargain." The public
sector analogue to management prerogative is the concept of illegal
delegation of power. The public employer may refuse to bargain on
the grounds that the subject matter raised in negotiation is one on
which he cannot yield his discretion to act unilaterally." Thus only
in the public sector can a subject be considered truly "nonbargain-
able" in the sense that the parties cannot bargain over it, even if both
desire to do so, because the public employer is prohibited from doing
so by the illegal delegation doctrine. The question, then, is where
the line separating bargainable and nonbargainable subject matter
in the public sector ought to be drawn. Statutory language - regul-
lating both private and public bargaining - is of little help since it
defines the scope of bargainable matter as "wages, hours of employ-
ment and other terms and conditions of employment." '59
The only private sector resolution to this difficulty has been the
creation of two classes of bargainable matter: mandatory and volun-
tary (or permissive)." ° Mandatory subjects are those about which
the parties are required to bargain to impasse; voluntary subjects
may be discussed at the bargaining table only if both agree.61 This
has not proved to be a very clear means of classification and has been
subject to criticism.62 Judicial attempts at defining the duty to bar-
gain in this manner are doomed to failure because no two bargain-
agreement on matters within the scope of representation." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505(1968).
55. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b) (3) (1964).
56. It is not only employers' refusal to bargain which may bring about an unfair
labor practice. See 71 HARV. L REV. 502 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964).
58. Cf. In re Farmingdale Classroom Teachers, 68 L.R.R.M. 2761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1968); Recommendations of Fact Finding Panel, In the Matter of the Dispute
Between the State of New York and Council 82, AFSCME (April 1, 1970), quoting
the select Joint Legislative Committee on Public Employees Relations:
PERB has also been given the power to require the parties to negotiate in good
faith. The most significant aspect of this authority is in the determination of
the proper scope of bargaining.
If an employee organization feels that a certain topic is a proper subject of
mandatory bargaining and the public employer disagrees, the organization may
seek a bargaining order from PERB. The administrative agency then would
determine whether the issue involves a subject about which the public employer
can be required to bargain.
Id. at 19-20.
59. National Labor Relations Act § 9(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). Cf. N.Y.
CiV. SERV. LAW § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1967); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 243.730 (1967);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52(2) (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.70(2) (1967).
60. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
61. See, e.g., Seitz, supra note 12, at 250-51.
62. See, e.g., H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 63-90 (1968).
For an early warning of the difficulties to be faced in governmental regulation of the
scope of collective bargaining, see Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining
by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HAlv. L. Rav. 389 (1950).
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ing situations are precisely the same and precedent applicable to one
set of facts is likely to be inapplicable to another. It is no surprise,
then, that it has proved extremely difficult for the NLRB and the
courts to give defined life, in the private sector, to the phrase "other
terms and conditions of employment" ;63 therefore, it is likewise
difficult to envision the viability of this judicially-interpreted test of
mandatory bargaining matter for the public sector. The Supreme
Court's latest attempt to speak to the issue resulted in the "industry
practices" test of Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB64 - a test
of little immediate use in the public sphere where cases would neces-
sarily be of the first impression. Nor has the mandatory/voluntary
distinction served the goal of industrial peace: "forcing [the parties]
to remove the disputed subject from the agenda will leave matters
of serious controversy unsettled; unrest, rather than stability, will
result."65 A better approach in the private sphere would be for the
law to stay out. "[T]he parties would decide for themselves on the
basis of interest, practicality, and economic power what to bargain
about. These factors would not be influenced by law. The scope of
bargaining would be tailored by the situation for the situation. 66
The duty to bargain in good faith, then, would refer only to ques-
tions of style and intent, not subjects of bargaining. Finally, in the
absence of a strike option,67 the need for the mandatory/voluntary
classification is lessened. In the private sector, when a subject is
declared "mandatory," negotiation over that subject may be pushed
to impasse; and the use of economic weapons - strike or lockout
are permissible.6" The same result follows impasse in negotiation
over "voluntary" subjects which the parties have agreed to discuss;
but, if the parties have not agreed to discuss certain voluntary sub-
jects, the use of these economic weapons - or any others - to
compel agreement to discuss is forbidden as an unfair labor practice.
Thus, in the private sphere the mandatory/voluntary distinction is
a useful tool for eliminating the possibility of strikes or lockouts over
subjects which the parties consider not important enough to justify
such strong action; the voluntary classification allows either party
to remove these subjects, in advance, from the bargaining table and
thus to minimize the number of issues over which the parties could
reach an impasse. In the public sphere, where there is no right to
63. See generally Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, in PUBLIC
POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 60 (Shister, et al., eds. 1962) ; Platt, The Duty
to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J. 143 (1968).
64. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The employer had subcontracted out work previously
done by its union employees in order to save money. The Court upheld the Board's
finding that this violated the employer's obligation to bargain collectively. The Court
said, "While not determinative, it is appropriate to look at industrial bargaining
practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject with the scope
of mandatory bargaining." Id. at 211.
65. 71 HARV. L. REV. 502, 512 (1958).
66. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 62, at 79.
67. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 13-18 (1969). But see new
Hawaii statute, reproduced in 349 G.E.R.R. F-1 (May 18, 1970).
68. Cf. M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 250-51
(1970) ; Schmidt, Collective Negotiations in Michigan: An Overview, in D. KRUGER
& C. SCHMIDT, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 170, 178 (1969).
[VOL. XXX
SUBJECTS FOR BARGAINING
strike or lockout, pushing a subject to impasse would, presumably,
merely result in the implementation of impasse procedures such as
mediation, fact finding or some form of arbitration, none of which
constitute the ultimate economic conflict presented by a strike or a
lockout. Because the consequences of impasse are not as disruptive
in the-public sphere, there is a corresponding decrease in the need to
minimize the number of subjects over which the parties could reach
such impasse. Thus the rationale for the mandatory/voluntary dis-
tinction in the private sector offers little support for the use of that
distinction in the public sphere.
The private sector mandatory/voluntary distinction is, there-
fore, not appropriate for use in the public sector. The public sector
distinction must be one that clearly defines what is and what is not
bargainable - rather than what may or may not be required bar-
gaining matter. For this purpose, the judiciary, which bases its de-
cisions on precedent or interpretation of existing law, is without
adequate foundation for setting the standards by which to determine
those areas of unilateral decision-making in the public sector. The
natural tendency to preserve governmental power makes the execu-
tive branch an unsatisfactory choice as arbiter of bargainability in
the public sphere. The legislature, equipped as it is to hold hearings
and to draft statutory guidelines, is the proper governmental branch
to define these standards of bargainability.
There has been relatively little litigation over the scope of bar-
gaining in public employment.6 9 Much of what there has been has
focused on two issues: union security and the arbitration of unre-
solved grievances. In Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union,70 the Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire held that the union shop was a
proper subject of bargaining, so long as ultimate power resided in
the municipality and, in this case, the police commissioner, to hire
and fire personnel and to manage the police department. 71 And in
Wisconsin, the state supreme court has held that arbitration as the
terminal point in a grievance procedure is a mandatory subject of
bargaining. 72  Some courts and labor boards have borrowed the
terminology of the private sector. A Michigan trial examiner, for
example, developed a list of "mandatory" subjects for teachers and
school boards in that state. 73
As is true in other areas of municipal employee law, we look
to New York City for the most far-reaching trends in this area. The
Board of Collective Bargaining (a part of New York City's tripartite
Office of Collective Bargaining) has ruled that any management de-
69. See generally St. Antoine, The Consent of the Governed - Public Employees'
Unions and the Law, Address Before The Second Annual Collective Bargaining
Forum, The Institute of Collective Bargaining and Group Relations, New York City,
May 18, 1970.
70. 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968).
71. But cf. Benson v. School Dist. No. 1, 344 P.2d 117 (Mont. 1959).
72. Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30(1967) ; see School Bd. v. Werb, 65 L.R.R.M. 2488 (Cir. Ct. Wis. 1965).
73. The subjects are the right to evaluate curriculum, class schedules, size of
classes, selection of materials, planning of facilities, and procedures for rating teacher
effectiveness. 186 G.E.R.R. E-2 (March 3, 1969).
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cision having a "practical impact" on working conditions may be-
come the subject of bargaining if the city does not act to correct
the impact.7 4 A unanimous Board explained that it was referring to
any "unreasonably excessive or unduly burdensome workload, as a
regular condition of employment. 7'  The Board of Collective Bar-
gaining has formally accepted the private sector's mandatory/volun-
tary distinction in a dispute over the bargainability of some 151 of
241 contract demands by the Social Service Employees Union
(S.S.E.U.). 76 The Board held that voluntary subjects could be
"discussed" by mutual consent and included in agreements without
their being considered mandatory in future negotiations. 77
The executive branch has been as ambiguous as the courts in
dealing with the thorny problem of defining the scope of bargaining.
New York City's executive order states the right of the city to make
certain decisions and then declares: "but notwithstanding the above,
questions concerning the practical impact that decisions on the above
matters have upon employees, such as questions of workload or man-
ning are within the scope of collective bargaining." ' All the union
has to do is show that those whom it represents are affected by the
management decision in question in order for unilateral decision-
making to be transformed into bilateral.7
Management's rights clauses ° could provide the framework for
delineating a proper scope of bargaining. Such clauses, however, al-
though commonplace in private industry, are rare in the public sector8 '
and are often so general as to be of little value. 2 Moreover, contract
clauses often give a false indication of the scope of the issues jointly
determined because the "real" scope of bargaining is frequently more
extensive than the "formal" scope.83
Evidence indicates that public managers have, up to this point,
opted for breadth rather than depth as regards issues to be negoti-
ated. 4 "That is, management appears willing to place no limit on
the number of negotiable issues so long as the actual power of the
union over the issues is severely limited."85 While one would hope
74. City of New York Fire Dep't & Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Bd. of
Coll. Bar. Dec. No. B-9-68, cited in Anderson, The Offlce of Collective Bargaining
in New York City, in J. LOEWENBERG & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
GOVERNMENT: READINGS AND CASES (to be published 1971, Prentice-Hall, Inc.). This
decision followed the lead of Mayor Lindsay's executive order in this regard. See
note 78 infra and accompanying text.
75. City of New York Fire Dep't & Uniformed Firefighters' Ass'n, Bd. of Coll.
Bar. Dec. No. B-9-68, cited in Anderson, supra note 74.
76. City of New York and Social Services Employees' Union, Bd. of Coll. Bar.
Dec. No. B-11-68, cited in Anderson, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. Executive Order No. 52, § 5c (N.Y. City, Sept. 29, 1967) (emphasis added).
79. Cf. Los Angeles County, Employee Relations Ordinance, Oct., 1968.
80. Management's rights clauses, generally, outline a particular area as to where
the employer will make the discretionary decisions. See N. CHAMBERLAIN & I. KUHN,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 86 (2d ed. 1965).
81. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STUDY ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT, chapter on The Employment Relationship (forthcoming in 1971).
82. Id.
83. Gerhard, The Scope of Bargaining in Local Government Labor Relations,
U. OF ILL. BULL., REPRINT SERIES No. 211 (1970).




for both breadth and depth in negotiation, the expansion of subject
matter itself is a good sign. "A very narrow scope reduces the
significance of collective bargaining. Effective collective bargaining
requires 'a reasonably wide range of negotiable issues.' "" Collec-
tive bargaining, after all, is a process whereby each of the parties
foregoes something it desires in order to obtain (or retain) something
it desires more."' Increasing the subject matter appropriate for bar-
gaining, therefore, increases the possibilities for exchange and agree-
ment. s This process ought not to be hampered unnecessarily. The
trend of decisions in the public sector - if the few decisions we have
indicate a trend - would seem to bode well for expansion of the
scope of the collective bargaining process. There is a danger, how-
ever, that the use of private sector terminology to define bargainable
subject matter will lead, as it apparently has in the private sector, to
haphazard and illogical restrictions on collective bargaining in the
name of the duty to bargain in good faith, or, as some New
York cases may indicate, to unwarranted expansions of the scope
of bargaining.
A balance must be struck between illogical restrictions on bar-
gaining and overexpansion into sensitive policy areas. The next
section of this paper attempts to set out certain statutory guidelines
for a proper scope of bargaining in local government employment.
II. APPROPRIATE SUBJECTS FOR BARGAINING
The right to bargain collectively in the local government service
has been set out. It has also been shown that the public sector is
rapidly borrowing private sector concepts of the duty to bargain in
good faith and the scope of the duty to bargain. It has been argued
that, while the doctrine of illegal delegation of power places certain
unclarified restrictions on the subject matter appropriate for bar-
gaining in public employment, the public sector would be ill-advised
to borrow private sector concepts to define a proper scope of bar-
gaining. It is not clear that these judicially-determined principles
are working well in the private sphere, and there is little reason to
suppose that they would serve the public sector any better.
Now we must turn to a comparison of the contexts in which
public and private sector bargaining takes place. It is only by under-
standing certain unique aspects of public sector labor relations that
we can more clearly define the limits which the doctrine of illegal
delegation of power places on the scope of bargaining in the public
service.
While it is true that "in our system of private collective bargain-
ing, economic power and the parties' desires are the only rational
determinants of what matters should be subjects of bargaining," '9 it
is not axiomatic that these should be the sole determinants in public
86. J. LOEWENBERG & M. Mosicow, supra note 74, at 239.87. Cf. N. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTrVE BARGAINING 220-21 (1951).
88. See Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments in Public Employee Bar-gaining, 67 Micn. L. REv. 919, 928 (1969).
89. Wellington & Winter, supra note 27, at 1111.
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collective bargaining. The economic context in which public employee
collective bargaining takes place is dissimilar to that of the private
sector."
There is no recognizable rational price structure or profit motive
in the public sector. Many municipal goods and services are not
divisible into discrete units in production or distribution and are pro-
vided free or at nominal charges to consumers while the great bulk
of their expense is borne by general revenues. Fire and police pro-
tection are classic examples of such "collective goods." On the other
hand, rational pricing is quite feasible in government-operated pub-
lic utilities such as transit and water; but these are often deliberately
run on deficit bases for political and social reasons. The New York
City subways, water supply, and the Staten Island Ferry are prime
illustrations of this proposition.
Not only is there lacking a direct relationship between the cost
of a city-supplied service and the price charged for it, but it may be
extremely difficult for local government to expand its tax base. The
exodus of the middle class from strife-torn cities has resulted in
contraction of the local tax base, and all cities face an elasticity in
their tax revenue curve with respect to population: increased taxes
yield further impetus for the harried middle class to reject urban
for suburban living." Thus there is no potential for a redistribution
of income from consumers or management to workers as was en-
visioned by Congress for the private sector when the National Labor
Relations Act was enacted.92 There can be only redistribution from
one municipal service to another or an unacceptable tax increase.
Arguably, such redistribution is properly a political question 8 which
should not be delegated by a city to the bilateral bargaining process.
But this would mean that bargaining is not proper on the subject of
wage levels. If there is to be any bargaining, it is difficult to imagine
it not including the question of wages. Perhaps the trend toward
increased state and federal aid to cities will avoid any such impasse
between a vital public interest in the levels of various services and
the demand of workers for collective bargaining.
The relationship which local government bears to those who
consume its services is such that the public stake is apt to be large
in many areas of decision-making. Those who manage the city or
county are legally responsible to the entire community. Those who
manage in the private sector, on the other hand, more often than
not see their immediate constituency as the shareholders of the firm,
not the consumers of the firm's product. It is the balance sheet which
is the main determinant of management decision in the private
sphere, 94 whereas it is the polling booth which has the most sway in
90. See Kilberg, Labor Relations in the Municipal Service, 7 HARV. J. ON LEG. 1,13-15 (1969).91. Wellington & Winter, supra note 27, at 1122; see Rehmus, supra note 88,
at 923.
92. See generally Friedman, Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unionsfor Economic Policy, in D. WRIGHT, THE IMPACT OF THE UNION 204 (1951).93. Derber. Who Negotiates for the Public Employer?, U. OF ILL. BULL., REPRINT
SERIES No. 199, at 53-54 (1969).
94. See generally R. DO FMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS (1967).
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the public sector. 95 Municipal and county officials are, at least theo-
retically, attuned to the demands of the public.9 6 The public union,
however, is attuned to the interests of its membership - which may
or may not coincide with those of the public, or segments of the public.
When management in the public sector gives up some of its "pre-
rogatives," therefore, it foregoes the right to make decisions in the
name of all the people. When management in the private sector loses
its unilateral power to act, however, the public loses little or nothing
because the decision-making process is merely transferred from one
private group to another, rather than from public to private. The
loss of the power to manage unilaterally in the public service is, there-
fore, more serious than the same phenomenon in the private sector.
Moreover, the public employee union may be less apt to bow to
management's leadership in crucial policy matters. The private sector
union must be sensitive to the plight of its employer in the market-
place because the jobs of its members depend upon the employer's
profit.9 The public union, however, fears neither layoff nor aban-
donment and does not believe in the possible bankruptcy of its
employer. 8
In addition, the professional positions which many public em-
ployees hold make it more likely that their bargaining demands will
center on crucial policy matters. Although it has been suggested that
all workers seek intellectual status equal to management,9 9 it is gen-
erally believed that it is the professional employee who feels his free-
dom most threatened by such management-oriented principles as "di-
rective leadership," "unit of command," and "task specialization."'0 0
Professional demands in response to such threats do not impinge on
management's policy-making role in the same way in the private sector
as they do in the public. Such typical industry requests as time off
to attend professional meetings, educational leaves, and the like are
professional demands only in so far as they are unique to the profes-
sional's immediate working environment. There is nothing to the
same degree in the private experience to compare, for example, with
the demands of the Social Service Employees' Union in New York
City for a twenty-five percent increase in twice yearly automatic
clothing grants and telephone allowances.' 0 1 The tendency of public
professionals to impinge upon management's political prerogatives
95. See generally R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
96. This includes the elected official's perceptions of public desires and needs, as
well as the impact upon him of various interest groups. See, e.g., R. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY" (1961).
97. See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 107-09 (1962); see also
Reder, The Theory of Union Wage Policy, 44-1 REv. OF EcoN. AND STAT. 34, 40
(1952).
98. Interview with Jerry Wurf, President of the American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 26, 1966, at 98.
99. N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 98
(1967).
100. Johnson & Hill, Managements' Dilemma - The Professional Employee,
503 CAL. MGT. REV. 37, 41 (1963).
101. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, su pra note 81, chapter on The Effect on Work
Management and Working Conditions. Perhaps private sector workers will follow
the lead of some shareholders in, for example, opposing the manufacture of napalm,
but this has not yet happened,
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are greater than the private professional's tendency to impinge upon
his employer's economic ones. It has been said of the New York
City school teachers that they are "convinced they are fully equipped
to head either the [union] local or the school system."' 2
On the other side of the coin, it is fair to say that, at least as
regards professional employees, nearly every policy decision of local
government has an effect upon the professional's working condi-
tions.'" A recent National Education Association brief to the New
Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission makes the argu-
ment well:
Among the most significant of working conditions to a teacher
are a broad panoply of matters, such as the quantity and quality
of textbooks, methods of instruction, curriculum, the number of
students assigned to a classroom, which not only affect the rela-
tive hardship of a teacher's daily tasks but are prime determi-
nants of the quality of education. Impact on the work of a
teacher and impact on the excellence of product are inextricably
intertwined. 0 4
In addition, the contact which many local government employees
regularly have with members of the community means that there are
pressures upon one who works in the public sector which are not
often present in the private sphere. Albert Shanker, president of the
United Federation of Teachers in New York, put it this way, "No
one dreams of going to Ford or General Motors and saying, 'Ralph
Nader says my car is unsafe; I demand you fire the following
workers.' In the schools it's very different. The parent marches in
and says, 'This class is behind in reading; fire the teacher.' "105
The desire which public unions have to expand the scope of bargain-
ing into policy areas is therefore understandable. But this does not
mean that it is acceptable.
The function of government as representative of all interests in
the community, the strategic nature of governmental decision-making
involving difficult choices between competing services, the generally
proven unworkability of strike prohibitions,' 0 6 the parochial nature of
union representation, 0 7 and the high probability of union attempts to en-
croach on areas of unilateral management decision-making demand that
life be given to the doctrine of illegal delegation of power in the form
102. Raskin, He Leads His Tcachers Up the Down Staircase, N.Y. Times, Sept.
3, 1967, (Magazine) at 4.
103. Cf. R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD (1967).
104. In re Ramsey Bd. of Educ. & Ramsey Teachers Ass'n, No. CE-11, at 8.105. Supra note 102, at 29. Another point of view has been expressed by a high-
ranking official of the Board of Education: "Shanker and his associates are mastersir the use of threats until they get their way .... No legal, economic, or educational
considerations are important to the U.F.T., just naked strength." Id. at 28.106. Work disruptions in the municipal service increased 271 percent from 1967
to 1969. ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 39-40; cf. Kilberg, supra note 90,
at 33.
107. CI. M. LIEBERMAN & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS?31 (1966) : "It is naive to believe that the employment conditions desired by teachers
will always be consistent with the solution based purely on educational policy."
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of proscribed subjects of bargaining. The desire for effective collec-
tive bargaining means that the proscription must be limited to those
areas where unilateral decision-making is essential or bilateral de-
termination is clearly inappropriate.
A first category of subjects not proper for collective negotiation
concerns matters which would require noncompliance with superior
statutory law or administrative regulation. Included within this cate-
gory, for example, are matters that would arguably conflict with con-
stitutional standards of equal protection or due process. A teachers'
union, for example, ought not to be permitted to demand that a board
of education give individual teachers the right to punish "unruly"
pupils as they see fit.' The "professional demands" of the Social
Service Employees' Union, referred to above, would have required
New York City to violate state and federal welfare regulations had
they been met.1°9
Civil service regulations are a distinct problem because they
often set working conditions and standards which employees desire
to bargain over. A civil service system, in the absence of an express
statutory prohibition, will not preclude the negotiation of collective
bargaining contracts which are consistent with it."10 But, to the
extent that a civil service system creates statutory rights, these can-
not be varied by agreement."' The civil service system can, there-
fore, be a major stumbling block to free collective bargaining. To
rectify this, "all non-merit functions should be transferred from the
civil service commission to a personnel department under the chief
executive officer of each local unit.""' Arvid Anderson, Director of
the Office of Collective Bargaining in New York City, has recom-
mended such an approach, retaining "the essentials of the merit sys-
tem with respect to the recruiting, examination, hiring and the estab-
lishment of standards for promotion and training.""'  Unfortunately,
practice and theory do not always comport. In Massachusetts and
Wisconsin, for example, the public employee collective bargaining
statutes specifically set out the superiority of existinz civil service
commission regulations."' In Connecticut, on the other hand, the
employment and promotion functions of the merit system are ex-
cluded from collective bargaining; but negotiated agreements super-
sede all other provisions of the Civil Service Act." 5 The Connecticut
example would seem to be the better one to follow, accepting the
general provision that collective agreements are not to supersede
108. In re Ramsey Bd. of Educ. & Ramsey Teachers Ass'n, No. CE-11, at 71-72.
109. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1967, at 38, col. 5.
110. See Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346,
351-52, 151 N.Y.S.2d 402, 406-07 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 117, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1957), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 866, 150
N.E.2d 705, 174 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1958).
111. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 299-302, 168 P.2d 741,
745-46 (1946).
112. Rehmus, supra note 88, at 927.
113. Personnel Opinions, 27 Pun. PERsoNNEL REv. 52 (1966).
114. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178(H) (Supp. 1969); Wis. STAT. § 111.91
(Supp. 1969).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (1958).
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constitutional or legislative guarantees other than the non-merit pro-
visions of civil service acts.
A second category of subject matter in which the public stake
is so great as to warrant a prohibition on bargaining are those matters
that vitally affect the adequate protection of the public from physi-
cal harm. An example of this type of prohibition is an arbitration
decision in New York City which held that the city is not required
to bargain with policemen and firemen over how many policemen are
put into a patrol car, the number of firemen on an engine or where
these men are assigned.' 1 6
In such areas as police, fire, sanitation and medical services, work-
load, work assignment and job content are particularly sensitive sub-jects. But it does not seem appropriate to place a total bargaining
ban on these subjects. In the New York City situation, for example, the
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) insisted that police patrol
cars should be manned by two men at all times in order to insure the
safety of the police officers. The city maintained that one man is
enough in low crime neighborhoods in the safer times of day. The
city wanted to assign the additional policemen to high crime areas of
the community; the police union was concerned with the safety of its
members. While the city's aims were laudable, so were those of the
PBA; the public stake is evident in police assignments but it is also
evident in police safety. A more recent New York decision held that
the city is required to bargain with the firemen's union over the
assignment of fire fighting units to high-risk hours and areas. The
Board of Collective Bargaining held that any management decision
with "practical impact" on employees' working conditions is bar-
gainable unless the city moves "expeditiously" to relieve the impact." 7
Here, the question of public safety - and particularly the safety of
high fire-risk ghetto areas - was ignored. This question, dealing
with work assignment and manning, should have been determined
unilaterally with the full public interest in mind.
A statutory ban on bargaining is called for where issues of public
safety are involved, particularly in the fire, police, sanitation and
medical services. An arbitration panel or court should determine
whether any particular union demand would be adverse to public
safety if accepted by the city. If so, the local government would not
be permitted to negotiate over the matter in question. No public
official ought to be permitted to bargain with a limited interest group
over issues which vitally affect the health and safety of the com-
munity. And the community should be able to hold its elected officials
directly accountable for successes and failures in this regard without
allowance for the give and take of the bargaining table.
A third area of nonbargainability concerns the social welfare
services, which generally include teachers, welfare workers, hospital
employees and other professional and non-professional employees. In
this area, the legislature must provide a comprehensive listing of
bargainable and nonbargainable matters, in each case balancing the
116. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1966, at 49, col. 2.
117. See notes 74 & 78 supra.
[VOL. XXX
SUBJECTS FOR BARGAINING
public interest with the right of public employees to be heard on
matters which directly affect their working conditions. In making
this determination, the legislature ought to weigh heavily the unique
concerns which teachers, social workers and other public professionals
have for the well-being of the population they serve; every effort
should be made to keep the subject matter within the bargaining
structure.
Of the entire category of social welfare services, education espe-
cially is of prime concern to all citizens and is a likely battleground
for a duel between "labor union concepts and civil rights concepts."'""
The schools are a sensitive area of contact between city employees
and ghetto residents: parents are certain to blame the schools for
the failure of their children while school personnel, confident that
they are doing the best that they can within the confines of the sys-
tem, are apt to be antagonistic toward the parents of their students. 1 9
Strategic level decisions dealing with what is to be taught, who
is to be educated and where schools are to be located should be made
solely by individuals whose job it is to serve the long-run public good
and who are responsible to all the people of the local community.
Course curriculum and textbook choice ought to be unilaterally set
by those who, it is hoped, will be more sensitive to the impact which
the social make-up of a community has on its educational needs.
There must be a degree of flexibility and leeway for teacher experi-
mentation; teaching methodology, therefore, should not be a matter
for unilateral school board determination. Subjects such as teacher
facilities and free periods for class preparation, because of their im-
pact on the teachers' working conditions, should remain open for
collective negotiation. There are certain subjects of a hybrid nature,
such as class size, which may be viewed as matters of educational
policy, but whose impact on working conditions for teachers is so
great that they ought to remain bargainable.
It is not intended that these guidelines prohibit individual
teacher-supervisor discussions on matters determined nonbargainable;
but that is quite different from formal collective bargaining where
unpleasant trade-offs might occur on matters of fundamental public
importance with a representative of a limited private interest.
III. CONCLUSION
I suggest these three guidelines as proper limitations on the
scope of the duty to bargain in local government labor relations.
They do not exhaust the list of arguable possibilities; an agency's
level of public assistance, as in the case of the New York welfare
dispute, might very properly be classified as nonbargainable. There
is no doubt that more study is needed before such guidelines are
established. Care must be taken when restricting the scope of bar-
118. Raskin, Why New York is Strike City, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1968, (Maga-
zine) at 9, quoting John Doar, President of the New York Board of Education.
119. Cf. Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill,




gaining - the possibility of throwing the infant collective bargain-
ing process out with the bath water is very great. 2 ' Too many re-
strictions on the scope of bargaining would be an inducement for
public employee unions to resort to strike tactics in order to obtain
their goals. The proper balance between employee rights and citizen
rights must be struck.
A caveat is in order. Were it possible to develop adequate dis-
pute settlement mechanisms for public employment so as to effectively
eliminate the strike threat, there would be less need to place restric-
tions on the subject matter of bargaining. The fear of local gov-
ernment capitulation to unreasonable union encroachments on the
policy-making process would be lessened by this corresponding de-
crease in union power. 2' I do not, however, believe it is possible
to effectively eliminate the strike or other work disruptions in the
public sector. Until such a system has been devised, these restrictions
on the bargaining system are a necessity. 22
120. Cf. Rehmus, supra note 88, at 928; Schmidt, supra note 68, at 179; Smith,
State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A
Comparative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 891, 908 (1969).
121. In the usual private sector situation, compulsory arbitration is neutral as to
effect on management and union power. However, where the public service is deemed
essential, the union strike is an unequal power which is reduced by compulsory settle-
ment procedures.
122. Cf. McLennan & Moskow, Multilateral Bargaining in the Public Sector, in
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDUSTRiAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
Ass'N 31 (1969).
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